Sir Vince Cable is a distinguished former Minister, leader of the Liberal Democrat party and current Professor of Practice at the London School of Economics. Throughout his varied career, Sir Vince has also published extensively on issues in the fields of politics, economics and international relations, including ‘After the Storm’, reflecting on the aftermath of the global financial crisis, and ‘The China Conundrum’, focusing on China’s economic rise. From 2010 to 2015, Sir Vince served as the Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills, and President of the board of Trade, and between 2017 and 2019 served as the leader of the Liberal Democrat party. He has recently published his latest book, ‘Eclipsing the West: China, India and the Forging of a New World’ which investigates the rise of the two “superstates”, and their implications for the future world. In this interview, we discussed Sir Vince’s motivation for writing this book, its insights for understanding the world order and his experience of UK-China relations in and out of government.
Why did you choose to write this book at this moment in time?
I have a long-standing interest as well as an immediate one in these countries. In terms of India, I have been going back and forth for fifty years writing about the Indian economy, and have experience in business, family (my late wife was from India), so I wouldn’t say I have a deep knowledge but I have an extended knowledge. I have been going to China for thirty years, first with Shell, then as a minister and more recently in an academic capacity.
So I know a little bit about these two countries, and they have long been a source of fascination to compare their development, because they have one big thing in common, which is their size. The story previously was that China was bounding ahead, but that is no longer the case, which is something the book covers. And the book’s subject is very topical in that it contextualises the relevance of both countries for the world. I was previously Shell’s chief scenario planner, which involved a lot of political analysis of these countries, and in the last chapter I have tried to use that technique to think about what the world will look like in decades’ time.
How have you seen both of these states develop through your personal experience, both working for Shell and in government?
I have explained my personal context in relation to China and India. What strikes me is their similarities on many fronts. China embarked on Deng’s reforms over forty years ago, and India did very similar things in the context of their democratic system under Manmohan Singh. They both had the predicting effect of producing remarkable economic growth, which in China’s case has continued for four decades but is now running into some trouble and India is similarly experiencing some headwinds. There are also commonalities in their political contexts; their political systems are both highly conditioned by the fact that they have 1.4 billion citizens, which has required from them strong central leadership, territorial integrity and state capitalism. One of my key themes is this similarity, both in economic structure and political structure, despite the labelling.
Do you think that State Capitalism is becoming the norm in the global economic system, or is it still a very new form emerging onto the global scene?
I refer to state capitalism in the context of China and India which both have emerged from a very dirigiste approach to their economies and have rapidly liberalised, so they have both approached this problem from the same direction. Both are roughly fifty-fifty in their public-private sectors, with both having a private rural economy employing hundreds of millions of people, both have a highly competitive SME sector, and amongst the big enterprises there is a large amount of state ownership, with China having slightly more. I can’t think of a better phrase to describe this phenomenon, I think ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ is what most of us call private enterprise, and India also hates the phrase but I think it’s the most accurate description.
You talk about the idea of the Kindleberger Trap in the book, where emerging states are reluctant to take global leadership roles. How have you seen China and India emerge onto the global scene since 2010?
The Indians have always been fervent supporters of non-alignment, and have been attached to the United Nations. They are increasingly frustrated that their growing economic weight is not being reflected in bodies like the World Bank and the IMF, but they have a long-standing commitment to multilateralism and non-alignment, or what they call ‘multi-alignment’.
The Chinese are more recent converts to this idea. China was however one of the best pupils of the IMF; they followed policy advice and never defaulted on their loans. And there has been a growing feeling that China and India can no longer just be ‘takers’ and they have responsibility for the system that benefitted them.
There is also important cooperation on ‘global commons’ issues like climate that the Americans have walked away from, and which China is seeking to take more global leadership on. They are also using their initiatives (development, security, civilisation), which is a lot of jargon but is symbolic that they now want their world view to be better understood globally.
What do you think states like Britain can do to engage with China and India on issues of global governance, especially at a time when the US has walked away from many institutions?
In the case of Britain, we have to hedge our relationships. Because of our position relative to Europe (thanks to Brexit) we need to cultivate global partners, and we are currently heavily reliant on the US which has become capricious and somewhat bullying. So having as good relations as possible with countries like China, India, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia to name a few, is absolutely essential and we should be looking for opportunities to work with them.
What is your assessment of the current world order and where China and India fit into that; is it a multipolar world order?
I do think it’s a good description but I don’t think that it is a stable order. First of all we have these geopolitical alignments, and under Biden it was clear that there was an effort to create a ‘Global West’, with US seeking to align its allies against China, Russia and their friends. Now Trump is in the White House the US is much more transactional, and less concerned about global alignment. The other instability is the lack of global leadership in terms of the global commons like climate change and humanitarian crises, and there is there is a real worry that global cooperation on these issues decays in this unstable environment.
How do you think it is possible to regain a consensus on global governance in this context, especially between countries like the UK and China who’s values traditionally don’t align?
Britain isn’t a major player these days; nobody is going to listen to preaching from London these days. The EU is a major player but doesn’t like to take up leadership unilaterally. It may be possible for the UK to help to revive a vision of shared multilateralism between certain cooperating states; the Canadians, South Koreans, Australians and others, in a way that the Chinese can cooperate with us. But that would mean stepping back from reliance on the US, to which the UK is now some sort of vassal state and there seems to be no appetite in the UK to do that currently.
What was your experience of the ‘golden era’ of UK-China relations as a minister, and in hindsight what is your reflection on that period?
People were very dismissive of it and still are today, but I think it was a very sensible pragmatic approach at the time. We understood there were threats as well as opportunities and we sought to minimise the threats as well as maximising the opportunities in trade, finance, education and other things. It wasn’t a very deep relationship above the exchange of positive platitudes, but it was a time that the UK was looking to diversify its trade away from Europe to new markets like China and Brazil for example. What has happened since is that the security hawks (the Ian Duncan Smiths of this world) along with the Americans have poisoned the well, and undoubtedly the Chinese did misbehave themselves in many ways with espionage and cyber security concerns to name a few. It is becoming a difficult relationship, but I think there are plenty of areas of shared interest where we can build a constructive partnership.
UK Forum on a Multipolar World 
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