Dr Sreeradha Datta is a professor of international affairs at O.P. Jindal Global University, and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Dr Datta’s research focuses on area studies in South Asia, the Bay of Bengal and the Indo-Pacific, looking at connectivity, regionalism and security challenges there. She was previously a Senior Fellow and centre head of the Neighbourhood Studies Vivekananda International Foundation in New Delhi, and served as the director of the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata, as well as having held fellowships with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She is also currently the Director of the Centre for Analytical Research and Engagement, a research centre within Jindal University. She has written over ten books, her most recent one being ‘Bangladesh on a New Journey: Moving Beyond the Regional Identity’. In our discussion, we covered competing connectivity strategies in South Asia, Bangladesh’s regional relationships with India and China, and its emerging global identity.
Can you explain the idea of ‘connectivity strategies’ and their importance for geopolitics?
What we have seen in the last three decades is the increasing interdependence of nation states, with not just political engagement but also economic and social ties. This is underway in the global south as well as the north, and has necessitated the development of new infrastructure to facilitate interconnection. Especially in South and Southeast Asia, this takes the form of transport corridors to allow the movement of goods and people to freely move. Connectivity strategies therefore are therefore essential mechanism and measures through which nation states are connected with each other. Physical connectivity through infrastructure initiatives is widely accepted as essential to keep up with the pace of global growth. Thus, schemes like China’s Belt and Road Initiative having significant global reach and implications, making it an important factor for geopolitics today.
In your research you have looked at how state-led connectivity initiatives can crowd out local connectivity, why is this and how can they overcome this?
Our research on connectivity focused not only on the ‘hardware’ of connectivity, i.e. roads and railways, but also on the rules of connectivity or the ‘software’. For example, some transport systems have been difficult to adapt to current needs and regulations, and have not been integrated with regional transport links. This can be seen in the narrow-gauge rail found across South Asia, or certain roads which do not have the axle strength for supporting carrying cargo load and thus are damaged by heavy vehicles, prohibiting them from integrating with wider transport links. With upgradation and modern technology there has been an attempt to overcome these issues and improve the quality and seamlessness of transport corridors. The ‘software’ of transport corridors has also been significantly improved, with new technologies introduced to facilitate border crossing, through easier compliance with regulations, and real-time tracking of cargo and many more such initiatives have reduced the transportation costs .All of these developments fundamentally address efficiency of exchange, improving the ability of goods and people to interact, also at lower costs.
How do nation states’ connectivity strategies compete?
Looking at the example of South Asia, many states have joined China’s BRI but India has opted to build its own links with neighbouring countries. In a simplistic way, these initiatives can be seen to be competing, especially as India increasingly aims to connect South Asia with Southeast Asia and overcome the lack of land-connectivity with Southeast Asian states. India is also improving its port infrastructures and enhancing its maritime architecture as well as connectivity linkages regionally. However, these competitions are still win-win, as neither is taking away from the other’s gains, on the contrary given the growing business momentum , every new connectivity infrastructure it is enabling states to engage robustly with each other. Each connectivity strategy potentially contributes to economic growth and development of all those that are being connecting through these initiatives.
What is Bangladesh’s current relationship with the BRI?
My latest work, which has been published in a book called ‘Decoding China’ edited by Ashok Kantha, looks at the current state of the BRI in South Asia. If you look at the BRI’s work in Bangladesh from an infrastructure perspective, they have done commendable work. They have built bridges over eight different rivers, including over the Padma river, which is one of Bangladesh’s largest rivers and splits the country in two. China’s contribution in terms of infrastructure development has been immense, and has been sustained over many years. There have been some issues over the high rate of interest and stringent loan conditions over some of these projects, but not comparable to the experiences of Sri Lanka or Maldives for example. Bangladesh as yet has manged to not fall in the serious debt crises situation like the other neighbours although its overall economy has been facing some challenges in recent times.
How has the BRI’s promotion of the ‘software’ of connectivity developed in South Asia in recent years?
In South Asia, China has expanded its connectivity primarily with the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, with Nepal for a variety of reasons having fallen down the agenda due to its political instability. China has expanded its connectivity through several non-commercial and non-infrastructure initiatives with these South Asian countries. For example, in recent times they were able to attract few Bangladeshis for medical tourism, given the present limited engagement that exists between India and Bangladesh. While is China is also a major trade partner for many of the South Asian nations it used other instruments as offering student fellowships to engage with South Asian students in Chinese institutions. China has through various initiatives is attempting to deepen its engagement with public and the youth of the south Asian region.
From the perspective of your research, is the BRI a centrally-managed project or a loose campaign mobilising a range of disparate actors?
Looking from South Asia, a lot of the centrally coordinated initiatives of the BRI relate to competing with India, and ensuring that it deepens its presence in the region. India is a relatively smaller and newer entrant in the infrastructural space. China has also increased its social engagement compared to previous years, which shows a broadening of their strategy and hope to reduce India’s role. However, a lot of the projects now associated with the BRI were initiated before the BRI was launched or are quite loosely related with the BRI’s central institutions. Whatever connectivity and infrastructural projects China is initiating in the region it is incorporating it within the BRI. While there exists a central coordination of BRI as situation arises the projects are expanded. China has been able to develop domestic constituencies in many of the South Asian polities
Now looking at your work on Bangladesh, can you start by explaining Bangladesh’s growth and development journey over the past few decades?
Ever since Bangladesh opened up the economy in 1991 for outside investment, Bangladesh has steadily grown, and despite its political ups and downs and the fragility of its democracy, it has achieved stable growth. Just a few years ago, Bangladesh had overtaken India to rank as the second-highest growth rate in Asia after China, although there has been a steep decline that position now but it has in the last couple of decades massively improved its citizens’ quality of life.
Bangladesh has always been seen as a ‘small South Asian nation’ with limited global engagement or presence, but as international attention has turned to the Indo-Pacific in recent years, coupled with Bangladesh’s growth story, it has begun to mark its presence on the global stage. In 2021, Bangladesh launched its Indo-Pacific Outlook which is indicative of its new global importance as a player in the region. Although presently many South Asian states are experiencing political instability, they have all managed to achieve economic progress through engagement with other economies outside South Asia, as south Asian economic integration has remained limited.
Bangladesh’s largest industry is the readymade garment (RMG) market, which has found successful markets in the US, Europe and around the world, and is a major reason why Bangladesh has attained recognition. Remittance from migrant labour work force from workers in the Gulf states, has contributed to Bangladesh’s economy. While India continues to be an important neighbour, Bangladesh seems interested to launch itself onto the global stage as a significant independent player given its economic growth story. Although it is exploring ways to diversity their commodity basket to reduce its dependence on RMG sector. And despite recent political crisis coupled with economic challenges, I believe Bangladesh will continue to be an important partner in the Indo-Pacific.
How has Bangladesh balanced the competing interests of India and China internally?
I think they have balanced them excellently, working with both partners closely. Starting in 2009 under Sheikh Hasina’s government, Bangladesh was able to address any security concerns India had vis-a-vis Bangladesh and India offered the largest line of credit and both the neighbours worked to establish cross border connectivity projects that should be seen as a precursor to a larger transport connectivity emerging in South Asia. Bangladesh had for many decades also engaged with China extensively on infrastructure and connectivity projects and Sheikh Hasina’s government carried that engagement forward. The main difference with the Awani League government was cognisant of Indian security concerns and it was confident that under Hasina that no anti-Indian activities would be allowed from within Bangladesh. And so, over the last 10 to 12 years, Bangladesh has engaged with India and China extensively, ensuring both the Asian neighbours contribute to Bangladesh’s development.
And more broadly, how has Bangladesh managed the competing global blocs and interest groups that have developed in recent years?
Bangladesh is quite unique in that, whilst it had ushered in significant economic growth, its did not pose as a security challenges or threat to any other. On the global stage, Bangladesh is not seen through the lens of security, and its external engagements has been more about political and economic cooperation. In terms of international institutions, the IMF and World Bank have supported many of the programmes which have boosted Bangladesh’s growth as well as its Human Development Index position. All governments since 1991 have sought a greater outreach with regional and extra regional powers including India, China USA and even Russia. Dhaka’s attempt has been to engage with nations across the globe trying to extend its footprints beyond the region. The USAID projects had contributed to its rural health sector robustly. Bangladesh has also partnered with Japan for Matarbari port projects and rapid mass transit rail projects. Dhaka as yet has prioritised economic engagement with its bilateral partners and managed the competing blocs without indulging into strategic complications.
Have you seen recent changes, such as the defunding of USAID and the global tariff regime of the US, affecting Bangladesh’s economy and political allegiances? And How do you see the next few months unfolding in Bangladesh?( I thought this would tie up the response below)
Over the last year Bangladesh has experienced political and economic instability, and some of the USA policies will invariably impact Bangladesh adversely. The withdrawal of USAID policies will throw the essential areas like healthcare, clean water, disaster response, education into a dire situation. While Dhaka has successfully negotiated a reasonable tariff line of 25% with USA, it will still impact its export sector to some extent, given that RMG is still struggling with closures, workers issues in the aftermath of the July uprising. Bangladesh’s recent economic troubles over its limited forex reserves coupled with several external factors and internal challenges has slowed down Bangladesh’s growth to 4% presently. Holding of elections that has been announced for February 2026 will help to usher in political stability, ensuring a return of investor confidence and projects. Hopefully a free and fair election will usher in a stable government that will amongst other, embarks on long term much-required reforms for better governance, financial reforms including a corrupt free polity. The sacrifices of the youths for a better Bangladesh should not be in vain.
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