By Deiniol Brown
Dr John Calabrese is Assistant Professor at American University, Washington DC and senior fellow at the Middle East Institute. Dr Calabrese’s research focuses on Middle East and East Asian international relations, and US foreign policy in those regions. Dr Calabrese founded and directed the Middle East Institute’s Middle East-Asia Project (MAP) and is the Book Review Editor of The Middle East Journal. In our interview, Dr Calabrese discussed the Trump administration’s policy orientation towards the Indo-pacific, and the US’s changing approach to foreign policymaking, as well as China and Middle Eastern states responses to new American strategies.
What consequence will Trump’s tariff regime have for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific? Does this signal a change of priorities for the US in its foreign policy?
The consequence of Trump’s tariff regime for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is largely negative. These tariffs are widely seen as leverage to extract trade concessions, but they have also damaged trust, jeopardized trade negotiations, and disrupted economic ties essential to regional supply chains. The worst-case scenario is that approach fractures critical alliances such as the Quad, pushes India and other partners toward closer ties with China or Russia, and thereby weakens the US position in the region.
What are the potential or developing implications of the US’s pivot away from the Indo-pacific under Trump?
I would not say that Trump is pivoting away from the Indo-Pacific in a wholesale manner. That said, however, his approach does represent a significant shift in tone, priorities, and methods compared to prior U.S. policies. His administration’s strategy is marked by a transactional, economy-driven, and sometimes unilateral stance rather than a consistent, multilateral alliance-building effort. While the Indo-Pacific remains strategically important to the U.S., especially in countering China’s rise, Trump’s policies have introduced considerable uncertainty and friction in the region.
You highlight the importance of informal institution-building in the US’s strategy. Why does this often get overlooked or misunderstood in analyses? How important has it been to the US’s foreign policy strategies in recent decades?
Informal institutions are often overlooked — and indeed underestimated — because they are unwritten, flexible, and operate through unofficial norms and practices, making them less visible and harder to analyse than formal institutions.
These informal schemes and frameworks have been used by successive US administrations with increasing frequency in recent years and are important because Informal institutions provide flexible platforms for cooperation and influence that are often more adaptable and resilient than formal mechanisms. They allow the US to exert influence and pursue foreign policy goals in ways that are cost-effective and less constrained by formal rules or domestic political hurdles. They may also signify the recognition that formal multilateral institutions are too unwieldy, subject to political gridlock, or otherwise inconducive to tackling specific challenges shared by a subset of like-minded states.
Can we see the US under the Trump administration building its own informal institutional network with like-minded states (e.g El Salvador and Hungary) or does it operate through purely interest-based relations?
Under the second Trump administration, the approach to foreign relations with regimes exhibiting authoritarian characteristics — such as El Salvador and Hungary — continues to be, as in the first term, transactional and interest-based rather than a deliberate effort to build institutionalized informal networks grounded in shared norms. Trump’s style is less about constructing informal institutional networks of cooperation based on shared values and more about pragmatic, often opportunistic dealings aimed at immediate gains.
Put differently, Trump’s broader move toward centralizing executive power domestically and employing aggressive enforcement tactics abroad reflects an affinity for authoritarian governance styles and signals ideological affinities, but these did not translate into efforts to build new formal or informal institutional alliances with such regimes.
To what extent are the Trump administration’s latest actions in the middle east, for example reaching out to Syria, done in the context of competition with China?
In my estimation, the Trump administration’s Middle East actions are deeply tied to strategic competition with China, aiming to block the latter’s rising influence through economic, technological, and security partnerships. I should add that this is not fundamentally different from the Biden approach, especially during the second half of his term in office. Where Trump has added muscle and momentum is in currying favour with the Arab Gulf states, with efforts that include massive AI technology and investment deals to position the US as a key partner in regional digital economies.
Has China changed its approach to relations in the gulf in response to Trump’s new strategy?
I have yet to observe any significant changes in China’s approach to the Gulf in response to the Trump administration’s actions during its initial seven months in office. China has retained its robust economic and diplomatic ties with the Gulf and other MENA states. Beijing remains averse to deep military involvement and does not seek to supplant the US as the predominant security actor. At the same time, Beijing undoubtedly has strong reservations about Washington’s unwavering support for Israel and has strongly opposed US military strikes against Iran – but has done little in either case to alter the situation on the ground.
How has the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran evolved since 2020? Especially considering the US’s orientation?
Since 2020, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has evolved from intense proxy conflict toward a cautious détente, influenced significantly by changing regional dynamics and shifts in US policy orientation. Though the two countries remain fierce regional competitors and mutual mistrust has not dissipated, it is telling that despite military escalations, including Iranian-backed Houthi attacks on Saudi territory, the rivalry did not result in open war; the Saudi leadership strongly criticized the Israeli and US attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities while Iran’s retaliation (limited, in any case) did not target Saudi Arabia.
Do the routes of engagement of the US with states in the middle east denote the changing nature of actors in international relations, with more emphasis on individuals, capital and commercial interest?
The Trump administration’s 2025 Middle East strategy highlights a transactional form of diplomacy where economic and technological cooperation, particularly trade and investment deals, are central. This signals a shift toward utilizing capital and commercial interests as key tools of influence and engagement. This economic statecraft is combined with a strong emphasis on personalized, transactional diplomacy, where interactions with key leaders and influential individuals (e.g., friend and “special envoy” Steve Wittkof) play a critical role.
Does China’s commitment to using the UN for conflict resolution on this issue suggest an engagement with the liberal international system that now contrasts the US’s approach?
China’s active use of the UN and adherence to multilateral conflict resolution mechanisms on the Israel-Hamas issue sharply contrasts with the US approach, which has leaned toward unilateral support for Israel and less emphasis on multilateral frameworks. This difference represents a broader divergence in styles of international engagement amid great power competition, with China emphasizing institutional norms and political inclusivity, while the US pursues transactional, interest-driven diplomacy. But I would add that China’s approach is not driven solely, or perhaps even primarily by the desire to uphold norms and principles. There are powerful incentives to use the UN as a vehicle for “shaming” the US/the West and gaining favour with the countries of the Global South.
What effect will the cutting of USAID likely have on US security interests in the horn of Africa?
The halt or severe reduction of this aid will exacerbate food insecurity, disrupt HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention programs, and hinder other critical health interventions in countries like Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya. Indirectly, the loss of USAID funding risks increasing recruitment into militant groups by heightening social grievances and economic desperation. In my opinion, it is counterproductive to US national security interests, contrary to American values, and squanders international goodwill. Again, in my opinion, it is callous, cruel, morally indefensible, and a stain on our country.
Does the US’s change in global engagement style seek to emulate China’s interest-based and mutually beneficial investment strategies?
There is some truth to the argument that the US is shifting toward a more interest-based and commercially oriented global engagement style, which shares some features with China’s investment-driven influence approach but differs significantly in execution, state control, trade tactics, partnership stability, and geographic focus. The US style under Trump reflects more transactional, short-term leverage rather than China’s longer-term, infrastructure-based, and state-coordinated investment diplomacy. Therefore, the US is not wholly emulating China’s interest-based strategies but rather seems to be evolving toward a competitive, transactional variant of economic statecraft.
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