By Deiniol Brown
Dr Kerry Brown is a professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau China Institute at King’s College London. Dr Brown has published extensively on Chinese politics, Chinese history and the UK-China relationship, including his latest book ‘Why Taiwan Matters’ which delves into the history of Taiwan and its relevance to global politics. In 2024, Dr Brown also published the book ‘The Great Reversal’ which traces the history of UK-China relations across 400 years. Dr Brown is also an Associate Fellow on the Asia Pacific Programme at Chatham House, and has previously served as the First Secretary of the Embassy of the United Kingdom, Beijing, and leader of the Europe China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN). In this interview, Dr Brown discusses the current state of China-Taiwan relations, China’s approach to international relations and ongoing interactions between the UK and China.
Are China’s military operations in the South China Sea another form of rhetoric, or do they constitute more concrete actions on threatening Taiwan’s security?
I think that these operations certainly add to the pressure on Taiwan. Words can be an action too, and this consistent pressure on Taiwan through operations, and the rhetoric of Chinese officials has made a big impact on Taiwanese politics. These are all part of China’s strategy to try and isolate Taiwan and make it feel under threat. And when the world is in the distracted state it is now, with all the other conflicts globally, China hopes to make Taiwan more apprehensive and uncomfortable, forcing it into making compromises with China.
Have you seen the change in tone of global politics which has occurred this year, affect the China-Taiwan issue? For example since the start of the second Trump administration?
There are three parts to this problem usually; what’s going on in China, what’s going on in Taiwan and what’s going on in America. In China, we have a rough idea of the situation, Xi Jinping’s policy position still remains the same. In Taiwan, the newly elected government has a more difficult relationship with China, but it is a continuation up to a point with the previous administration being the same party.
Where we see the main difference is in the position of America. Trump’s position on Taiwan is quite ambiguous, which is a return to strategic ambiguity which has been central to the US’s strategy for most of the last half century. On the one hand, Trump wants less responsibilities internationally and wants limited involvement in conflicts. But on the other hand he wants to safeguard the American economy, and Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is currently central to that. In a sense, semiconductors are a thing that Taiwan has and America should have, and the US has looked to boost domestic production of semiconductors.
Under Biden, he stressed the US’s commitment to Taiwan and at times Biden said the US would fight for Taiwan. Under Trump, he has been applying economic pressure to Taiwan equal to other countries in order to secure a better trade deal, but to an extent he has also been using Taiwan as a leverage point against China. That’s a bit dangerous. At the Shangri-la dialogue, secretary of defence Pete Hegseth came out with quite a standard position on Taiwan which signals continuity, but at a time of crisis it is impossible to know what this administration would do. I think it’s possible they may stand with Taiwan, but at the end of the day it’s a transactional relationship, and if they thought they could get a better deal out of China, there’s no reason the US would be loyal to Taiwan.
What do people in the UK and in the ‘West’ in general misunderstand about Taiwan, and the China-Taiwan relationship?
I think there is a lot of misunderstanding. One big thing is the status of Taiwan; a lot of people think it’s a country, and it isn’t. In many ways it has the attributes of a country; it has its own army, central bank, currency, government. It has everything somewhere needs to be a country apart from recognition, and a lot of people don’t understand what that means. I also think a lot of people wouldn’t understand the One China policy or ‘One China principle’, with good reason because it’s a complicated principle and it’s a complete contradiction to common understanding on international relations.
I think many people may even be unaware of the issue between China and Taiwan altogether. Policymakers and politicians should know, but often levels of understanding on this issue vary greatly. The Taiwanese government has a priority to educate policymakers on this issue globally. Over the years I’ve been on visits to Taiwan with groups of political figures to educate them on the political situation between Taiwan and China, but that’s still the minority, most people have quite a basic understanding, and many have no understanding at all.
Do you think that the more aggressive rhetoric used by Xi, sometimes called ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ is inherent his leadership style, or can they be separated?
Xi’s rhetoric is part of a nationalist style of communication and diplomacy in China that has been present from the very start. Since the beginning of Xi’s regime, China has grown in power and its voice has therefore grown louder, which has led to a lessening of this harsh rhetoric. But there are also differences in tone, for example at the start of the Covid pandemic, China and the US’s dialogue was close to just shouting at one another, which is when the ‘wolf warrior’ label was really prominent. Now China tends to use a more formal and formulaic rhetoric in its communications, which reflect the interests and priorities of the regime and is less aggressive than before. However on some issues, such as Taiwan, it can come across more harsh. The government’s line on Taiwan is basically ‘this is an internal matter, go away’, which can seem quite confronting.
China’s diplomacy has improved a lot in recent years as it has been integrated into the global diplomatic system. In the past it’s communications were way worse, but there are still such differences between China’s communications and other countries. In this context, it’s so difficult for countries to disagree with each other and not sound confrontational. At the moment, China and the US’s dialogue is relatively civil despite the anger and really nasty language used in the US sometimes about China, and the same for online in China. However, the diplomatic language is still relatively polite.
You write a lot about the importance of Chinese value systems in their contemporary politics, but a lot of people assume that China embraces realism on the global stage. How important are value systems in China’s international relations?
They’re important insofar as China thinks it’s a unique actor on the global stage with it’s own unique values and political system. Culturally, it’s a unique actor because of its belief in its own exceptionalism, with 5000 years of civilisation; up to a point that’s worth taking into account as affecting its international relations. It’s got its own history which informs how China views itself in a specific way.
However, China is deeply involved in the international system and engages in a lot of activities in the same way that other states do, albeit with Chinese characteristics. I therefore think it’s better to see China as a hybrid actor rather than an exceptionalist actor. America thinks of itself as an exceptionalist actor too, but for some reason it seems to think that its values are more transferable, but China doesn’t believe in that. I think those are two very different mindsets, and that’s why I’m sceptical of the view that China wants to become a great power like the US, because it doesn’t have universal values, which makes it a different kind of actor.
How can Western countries like the UK better engage with China, recognising the uniqueness of China’s approach to international relations?
I think we need to accept the basic principle that there are underlying ways that engagement works on the global stage that everyone accepts, even states like North Korea. Whatever your knowledge levels of a state, you just engage in the processes; trade processes, political processes, there are a lot of existing mechanisms that dictate how to behave. You don’t have to have a specialist knowledge of China to engage with it on environmental issues for example, because that’s a global subject. Of course specialists are useful in the particular ways to engage with a country on certain key areas, but in general countries are just pursuing their own interests through established systems. You don’t need specialist knowledge on the other partner until it comes to specific issues where knowing where they are coming from and what their values are is important, but you can go a long way without that.
The language that the Chinese government uses is quite unique compared to the communication styles of other states. Does China’s communication style affect its relations outside of China or is it purely designed for domestic consumption?
These communications and symbols frame the way that people act in China, and therefore affect China’s international relations. A lot of the time you’re talking about slogans, such as the ‘China Dream’. On the one hand, people in China engage with these practically, and on the other they just pay lip service to them. China’s outward-facing propaganda is often criticised for being a bit tone-deaf and not appealing to Western readers. Chinese publications like the Global Times aren’t global media sources, people read the New York Times, the Financial Times, the Sydney Morning Herald, these sources have a more global identity and appeal to an international following. That is a big impediment for China, because it wants to grow its global voice, and maybe some of these outlets merit some trust and some engagement. However, when China does speak up directly as a government, people are then more willing to give it the benefit of the doubt and listen to it.
How important is Britain as an actor in China’s historical identity?
In the period of high industrialisation and the key moment of modernity where the Western powers overtook states like China, Britain was the leading global power and the key actor engaging with China. In the 19thcentury in particular it was the main power engaging with China and connecting China to the world, and this was a big clash of civilisations and world views that has huge implications for both countries to this day.
As I argue in my book The Great Reversal, it was actually a slow retreat during the 20th century as the role of Britain as a global power retreated, and other countries began to become more involved in China. But the memory of the 19th century is still a strong one, and Britain plays a major role in the century of humiliation, which has left a huge ‘memory stain’ on the UK-China relationship. This is all still very relevant to our relationship now, despite Britain now being a middle-ranking power.
In the past you’ve criticised the UK’s China policy in it being somewhat deaf to historical legacies. How should the UK’s approach to China adapt to be more cognisant of the history?
I think that the recent speech by Foreign Secretary David Lammy in parliament on the China audit outcome was good, where he said that Britain wasn’t confident in dealing with China because it has a lack of skills and knowledge. One thing that we can all do is improve our knowledge of Britain’s history with China, a lot of which is accessible. I wrote The Great Reversal to give us that history, and to make it as accessible as possible for people in this field.
I think we now have a better position to be consistent with what we want from China. Its ok to want on one side economic engagement, on the other protecting our own security. These are common problems, and we can balance these two competing priorities. I don’t think that the kind of ‘existential threat’ that some people think China poses as being real because I don’t think it’s that kind of expansionist power. It is however a different power than Britain, and we need to better use our resources and existing connections to engage with China. We have a lot of resources we can use but are being side-lined, which is upsetting.
Do the UK and China have an overlapping interest in maintaining global multilateral institutions and systems, or are both powers only capable of interacting on mutual interest?
I think they’re both pragmatic powers, and that both have embraced global engagement and multilateralism. But they have very different values and that’s where the problems start in their relationship. Britain and China do have a lot of bilateral dialogues too; Rachel Reeves attended a financial dialogue earlier this year, and we talk to each other a lot, as we have for the last 400 years. I also think we have more in common than we would like to accept or acknowledge, particularly at the moment with issues like climate change, AI, and both countries approaches to world politics. You could argue that on these issues Britain and China are more aligned than Britain and the US.
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