By Deiniol Brown
Dr Joseph Ledford is a Hoover Fellow and assistant director of the Hoover History Lab at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Dr Ledford’s research focuses on the history and dynamics of US foreign policy in the Americas in the last two centuries, and frequently contributes to the debate on contemporary US foreign policy. He has previously testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on US Policy in the Western Hemisphere and has been published in several journals including the Journal of Military History, and Defence and Security Analysis. His upcoming book ‘Of Scandal and Power: A History of the Iran-Contra Affair’ looks to give a comprehensive history of the Iran-Contra affair. In our discussion we covered the question of the US’s shift in foreign policy under the second Trump administration and the motivations underpinning it.
Why have the Americas been neglected in US foreign policy in recent decades?
As a historian, I became interested in the neglect of the Americas in recent US foreign policy because it seemed to me a historical anomaly. The Monroe Doctrine seemed to be a subject of bipartisan consensus throughout US history, meaning that the security of the Americas has always been central to its foreign policy. As George Shultz would say, ‘foreign policy begins in your own neighbourhood’. However, since the George W. Bush administration, the western hemisphere has taken a back seat in US foreign policy. This has been pushed by issues like the global war on terror, the rise of China and a newly expansionist Russia.
During the George W. Bush administration, there was an effort to engage with the Americas, and the US did seek closer ties with Mexico, secured the CAFTA-DR trade agree, and cooperated more with Colombia. The Obama administration did prioritise relations with Mexico, through frameworks like NAFTA, but Obama’s engagement with the broader Americas was limited. In Trump’s first term, Trump engaged with the Americas on some key issues; anti-narcotics, Venezuela, migration, but there was no overarching strategy towards the Americas. In the Biden administration, there was a neglect of the Americas again, as he was more oriented to transatlantic relations, and combatting the China threat. The Biden administration however ignored China’s expansion in the Americas, and failed to forge any concrete agreements with Latin American states. Overall, there is a combination of reasons for the neglect: the orientation of presidents themselves, the opinions of advisers, and arising events in other regions. If you combine these, it has created the anomalous neglect of the Americas we see today. Despite this, a few things have stayed consistent; mostly issues around migration and counter-narcotics strategies that have been maintained across administrations.
Do you see Trump’s current administration as adequately reorientating US foreign policy towards the Western Hemisphere?
In the first few months we have seen the execution of a strategic pivot to the Americas. It is going to take more time to see if the pivot is adequate, and some legislation will be needed to implement this change in strategy. However, in the first six months we have seen some really good progress. Looking at Panama, Trump has targeted the Panama Canal and increasing Chinese involvement there which threatened to contravene the treaty between the US and Panama, using this to recalibrate the relationship between the two countries. If you look past the rhetoric in Trump’s strategy, the actual actions there have been very successful.
Also, Secretary Rubio’s first trip abroad was to Central America, and is the first secretary of state to do this since Philander Knox in 1912, which was symbolic of the administration prioritising the region and the pressing issues there. Since then there have been several agreements with Panama, including a new memorandum of understanding with the Department of Defence for troop deployments, agreeing to leave the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, and the replacement of Huawei telecoms equipment there. These are both symbolic and pragmatic changes, as the canal is central to US economic security and defence operations in the region. Many countries in the Americas are also reaching out to the Trump administration to renew relations and agree to new trade deals.
In the case of Mexico, only Nixon can go to China and only Trump can go to Mexico. Regardless of the political rhetoric Trump has has found cooperation with President Sheinbaum on new trade agreements, on tackling the cartels, and on decoupling with China. Mexico has engaged with the US on further security operations, with drone flights and other operations to support their fight against the cartels. I think we’re on the cusp of a new security framework with Mexico, and having the closest relationship with Mexico that we’ve ever had. I think that therefore we have seen a positive move in the first six months, but going forward there will be sticking points, and there is a lot of work still to be done to combat Chinese investment in the Americas. The US needs to leverage the power of private capital to invest in Latin America, which needs a huge reform of the US International Development Finance Corporation to achieve that. If the US is not providing that capital and not engaging with its neighbourhood then countries will be forced to accept help from China.
Why has the relationship between the US and the Americas been historically limited in regard to investment and economic cooperation? Compared, for example, to initiatives like the Marshall Plan
I have two responses. The first is the importance of historical contingency; if we look at the case of East Asia, World War II and the occupation of Japan, followed by the Korean War and the Cold War, account for the US’s economic relationship with the region and the need for investment there. The same can be applied to Europe, where the post-war rebuilding initiative was contingent on the historical circumstances.
The US has however had a deep and contested economic relationship with the Americas throughout its history. If you look since the beginnings of NAFTA and then the USMCA, the US’s trading relationship in the western hemisphere makes up two trillion dollars. Obviously Canada and Mexico make up the bulk of that, but still 330 billion dollars of trade is done with other countries in the Americas.
So, if we return to the question of why is the US’s economic relationship with the Americas not as strong as other regions, some of it is history, some of it is the nature of America’s industries and corporations, some is also political circumstances like stability of different regions and the nature of Latin American regimes. The US has nevertheless been deeply engaged with the region. However, you are right that the relationship could be stronger; US trade with Japan and Korea is equal to that of roughly thirty countries in Latin America. Imagine if the US was invested in those countries to the same extent things might look very different there, but you need to look at the deeper historical and political development of those countries to understand why things are as they are now.
How central is China and the perceived ‘China threat’ to Trump’s strategy in the Americas?
Yes, I think Trump’s reorientation to the Americas is a response to China’s engagement with the western hemisphere, as well as other tangential issues some of which China is involved with too. Principally, the economic influence of China in the Americas is the US’s main challenge, and the second Trump administration’s moves have largely been to combat this. Trump has looked to increase private investment in the region that can have a real return on development, and has also sought to develop bilateral agreements with individual states, rather than broad regional agreements which, from his view, have been largely unsuccessful so far.
There is also a domestic political reason for the strategy, because the vast majority of American voters are concerned about the drug trade and immigration, and these were key issues of Trump’s political campaign. This is also the reason that these issues such as immigration have been placed alongside economic agreements in the Trump administration’s foreign policy.
Do you think that the change in US foreign policy towards an emphasis on the Americas is indicative of a change in ideology, or theoretical approach, towards foreign policy?
I think often the historiography may oversell the importance of universal theories in how policies are made, and policymakers aren’t generally thinking about transcending universal theories in real time when they’re deciding strategies. I do think however that the suggestion that the current regime is transitioning back to a more Nixonian realist position is true; if you look at interviews with Marco Rubio for example, there is a much greater emphasis on US national interest than global issues. Nevertheless, the US does still want to be the leading power in the world, it’s just recalibrating its relationship with the world system. It won’t abandon every multilateral institution, but it is undertaking a review of its engagements, and withdrawing from institutions it doesn’t see as furthering the American national interest.
The recent change has been prompted by a recognition that, although it would like to, the US can no longer engineer a global liberal international order wholesale, and that the world order needs to be more contingent on the decisions and leadership of other states. Some Americans have always been a bit sceptical of the international order ever since the end of World War II when the US became the leader of the western world, and this is an expression of that sentiment. Let’s not forget that the US still leads on many issues globally, and is the first to act when others are reluctant to do so without the support of the US, and it can still leverage its economy to make a significant impact on the international stage. In short, I can bet that in the White House and in the Pentagon they’re not throwing around the words ‘liberal international order’ or ‘realism’, but we can ascribe a kind of realism to the administration’s policies, because they focus first and foremost on the US national interest. Nevertheless, this is not an abandonment of the international order or the US’s place as a world leader. Polling still shows that most Americans want the US to play an active leadership role in the world.
How do you interpret Trump’s posture towards Canada and Greenland? Is it due to legitimate security concerns, personal political ambition or part of the US’s ideological turn away from its western allies?
I think Trump’s relationship with Canada in particular can be misunderstood. He’s trying to recalibrate relationships and trade agreements, and on a personal level he’s having difficulty working with Canadian administrations. If you look instead at Trump’s engagement with Mexico, which at the start of his term was the same as with Canada, Mexico has been much more constructive because President Sheinbaum handled Trump’s approach much better than Canada. Canada has also played hardball on many issues such as trade agreements and missile systems, which has irked Trump and provoked his current approach to Canada. His strong-worded diplomacy has led to a huge reaction in the media that this is the end of the US-Canada relationship, but I don’t buy this, I think this is just Trump’s version of politics and diplomacy. Behind the scenes things go much more smoothly, it’s just the personal relationships that Trump has which tend to make things less stable. There is also always a domestic political component to the rhetoric which can sometimes be ignored by scholars and commentators in assessing the outcome.
In terms of Greenland, I think this is a legitimate security issue that has been raised by many previous US presidents. Truman tried to pay Greenland for it, and FDR included Greenland in the Monroe Doctrine in World War II. Another part of it is a personal political ambition of Trump, that he wants Greenland to play a larger part in the US’s security.
Overall, I don’t think that these movements constitute a rejection of the Western political order, but it’s just a new form of politics and diplomacy that is more openly critical of other states’ shortcomings. This isn’t even necessarily new; the US and France have in the past had very fraught relations despite their military alliance. There are definitely some short term personal issues between Trump and other leaders, but the long term relationship is more stable than it seems.
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