By Deiniol Brown
Do you think the global and local nature of the Boko Haram insurgency is comparable to other insurgencies globally, or is it unique?
In the last 30 years, we’ve seen a lot of integration of how the world relates, and that includes conflict. however small or isolated a conflict is, it will have implications outside of its local context. If we look at Boko Haram, we have seen a resurgence of the idea of the ‘Islamic world’ and the perception of a lost hegemon. In a country like Nigeria, where the northern half is mostly Muslim, there has always been a big influence of the Islamic world.
Africa has also been very important to the world historically as a region in which others extract resources, and in current conflicts on the continent we see this with the involvement of states like China and the EU who are contesting resources there. External governments have continually sponsored and protracted local conflicts. You can never separate the local and global in any conflicts in Africa, this relationship is pervasive across African conflicts, not just Boko Haram. Even a conflict like the Ukraine war has implications for Africa, with it having a big impact on food insecurity, and with diplomatic conflicts between African states about which side to support. Conflicts today cannot be removed from their global contexts.
Can you explain how conflicts or insurgencies like the Boko Haram insurgency become securitised, and how this is relevant to the political economies of those conflicts?
What happens in these conflicts, especially since the end of the Cold War where non-state groups have become more prominent, is that these insurgents hijack the grievances, often legitimate, of local populations. Looking at this domestically, local politicians may have reason to support these insurgent groups in their quest for greater power in the central government, and in a country like Nigeria politics is highly contested by region and ethnicity. Local politicians can use these groups to intimidate opponents and advance their own campaigns for elections. Local leaders may also gain a lot of funding if an insurgency arises in their region, and these funds are often unaudited, meaning they can be misused by local government, giving them an incentive to perpetuate or even support insurgencies.
Returning to the example of Nigeria, we have seen that the Boko Haram insurgency has driven a lot of forced migration to the EU, who have then responded by viewing the issues surrounding Boko Haram in Nigeria as a security threat. The US also views Nigeria as a potential ‘safe haven’ for terrorist groups, and therefore view the insurgency as a security threat. Many of the western interventions in recent years arose from this logic, where foreign governments viewed insurgencies and civil wars as security problems for themselves, and saw the need to intervene to protect themselves. Despite the rhetoric of ‘responsibility to protect’ many interventions were prosecuted on the basis of external issues and external security, rather than the security of the local people.
You’ve also written about the securitisation of development. Could you explain this and where the securitisation of development has arisen from?
The idea of the ‘securitisation of development’ has come from the dynamic relationship between security and development which many scholars have written about. There is a disagreement between policymakers about how best to deal with insecurity, whether it is to establish security first and then pursue development, or whether to pursue development which will improve security. This leads to development itself being securitised, which has the result of development campaigns run by government agencies and NGOs functioning on a logic of security, rather than of development. We have seen this with the second Trump administration, where development and aid have been used as a tool of politics and foreign policy. Another example of this is the UK’s Conflict Stability and Security Fund, set up in 2015 which pledged £1 billion to try and stabilise insecure regions through development projects. These projects were pursued through a security logic, and were more concerned with ensuring minimal external impacts than actually changing the lives of the people they targeted. Often at times this aid didn’t even make it down to the people who needed, as the states the UK worked with would misappropriate it.
You write a lot about Boko Haram in particular. Have you seen a change in the situation in recent years?
I have an upcoming book being published by Indiana University Press called ‘Rethinking Boko Haram: The Evolution of a Jihadist Group since 2015’ which looks at how Boko Haram has changed over the last decade. Boko Haram has been very adaptive in this period, and has responded to the overwhelmingly militarised and securitised strategy of the Nigerian government by transforming from a social movement to an insurgent group. There have been other changes, such as increased in-fighting and factionalism within Boko Haram, and thousands of fighters surrendering their arms in amnesties. My perception in the book is that we need to conceptualise Boko Haram, as an armed insurgent group that has historical precedents and is part of intra-Muslim conflicts in Nigeria between different religious movements. Boko Haram has also been radicalised by the heavy-handed nature of the Nigerian military and their inability to provide governance in insecure areas.
Now that Boko Haram has imploded from in-fighting, what we can see is that the core driver of Boko Haram is the internal competition for hegemony between the different armed groups, and the controlling of resources. We can also see that the narrative around Boko Haram that it is part of a global terrorist network is largely inflated, and that Boko Haram is constituted mainly of local grievances and social contestations. Over the years, fundamentally, Boko Haram has declined because of the intense military response and better inter-service cooperation, but by and large the main reason for the decline has been the internal conflict between different factions.
Do you see continuities between the responses to terrorist movements in Africa undertaken during the Global War on Terror, and the legacies of colonialism?
The article I wrote on this topic was under the context of ‘Glocal’; looking at the global relevance of local political issues. The Global War on Terror (GWoT) led to a lot of interventions and counter-terrorist funding in Africa, for African states. In many cases these funds supported authoritarianism in those states if autocratic leaders were willing to cooperate on counter-terrorism, and the same for human rights infringements which were perpetrated in the name of counter-terrorism.
In my analysis I focussed on the cases of Nigeria and Uganda, two former British colonies that have experienced authoritarianism, especially in Uganda which has had the same leader since 1986. Nigeria has also had military leaders, but there has been no central strongman such as in Uganda. In both of these countries, governments have been quick to label protests and grievances with their leaders as terrorism in order to repress them through military action. This has been emboldened through the GWoT, which supported anti-terrorist capabilities and provided an easier narrative for suppressing rights.
In 2023 you were interviewed by the BBC on the position of the Wagner Group in Africa, what is their position now, have they been weakened or have they strengthened their postion?
A lot of people have identified a new ‘scramble for Africa’ in recent years. I think that Africa has always been very important to the world, but that the way in which Africa has interacted with the world has not been on an equal footing. Africa is now beginning to expand its position on the global stage, with involvement in BRICS and other institutions, and this movement towards a new world order. Within Africa you have many powers vying for power; Russia, China, India, and middle powers like Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, jostling for influence.
Looking at Russia specifically, I think it particularly capitalised on the anti-French sentiment that spread across the Sahel which led to France and the US to retreat from the region, and a wave of military coups. These military regimes have looked to Russia to sustain themselves, but I don’t think Russia provides anything special, other than a more hands-on approach to military support and intervention. Russia has also faced a lot of casualties, such as in Mali last year where dozens of Wagner mercenaries died. They have also faced some difficulties since the war in Ukraine where their numbers have been reduced. We can’t overestimate the role of Russia in Africa, which has been inflated by misinformation online, the main function they perform is regime protection, in exchange for access to resources. We can’t discount the leverage and agency of African leaders and their ability to balance their own foreign policy. Russia is not able to dominate and dictate these countries’ foreign policies.
Are African state’s cooperations with countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar signs of their interest in building a new world order, or are they purely interest-based bilateral relations?
You can look at them from an interest-based perspective, but beyond that there is a long-term strategy. In the case of Saudi Arabia, it’s ‘Project 2030’ is the country’s strategy for greater international cooperation, development financing and global cooperation. As the West, especially the US, becomes more isolationist and withdraws from Africa, there is a real opportunity for a new order to emerge. In the current world order there seems to be no hegemon, and African countries are hedging their bets by engaging with a variety of powers. States like Qatar are also hedging their bets by becoming involved in these critical competitions over resources and alliances in Africa. These states’ novel approach to engagement with Africa through open investment and cooperation differentiates them from traditional western engagement strategies, which signals a changing attitude and the building of a new system of global governance. Despite this, the practical economic interests of these states also cannot be ignored.
Do you see the rise of cooperation and governance integration in Africa through organisations such as the African Union? Or are Africa’s interactions still largely bilateral?
The AU has been part of the G20+ for several years now, and Africans have been campaigning for a permanent position for Africa on the UN Security Council. African states’ role in institutions like the UN have also been growing in recent years. However, the question of whether African states understand and can use the leverage they have remains to be seen. We are seeing some ruptures in Africa around democratic and authoritarian regimes, such as the recent emergence of Africa’s youngest leader in Senegal, and his progressive regime, and the transition of power in Botswana which previously had the same government for 50 years, whilst at the same time there is a rise in authoritarianism. There does seem to be an awakening of a more global conscience in Africa, and a strong campaign for global recognition across Africa. Africa is also incredibly important for the global economy in terms of resources, which is something else African states need to better leverage. However, the AU still relies on 80% external funding for its initiatives which means its capability for global power is limited.
Can you tell me about the work of the Centre for African Conflict and Development? What are the organisation’s aims?
I decided to create this centre nearly ten years ago to respond to the gap in research and commentary where Africans were failing to tell their stories themselves. I also have experience as both a researcher and policymaker, and so recognise the need to bridge policy and research, which the centre aims to bring. It’s approach is research and evidence-driven policymaking which is not isolated from the issues on the ground. We look at many issues pertinent to Africa, but tend to focus on that intersection between conflict and development, aiming to be a one-stop-shop in the business of providing knowledge for policies on these issues. Our flagship podcast has been very successful, listened to by diplomats, journalists and researchers, as we aim to disseminate knowledge and debate key issues.
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