By Deiniol Brown
Dr Mark N. Katz is a professor emeritus of government and politics at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has previously held fellowships at the Brookings Institution, the Rockefeller Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, and the Fulbright Program. He was also the 2018 Sir William Luce Fellow at Durham University. His research focuses on the USSR and Russia’s foreign policy in the ‘third world’ and Middle East, and has published extensively on Russia’s international relations and its importance for global politics. In recent years he has contributed to publications at the Carnegie Endowment, the Kennan Institute, ETH Zurich Centre for Security Studies, and the Middle East Policy Council. In this conversation we discussed the complex state of Russian and US relations with the Middle East in light of recent events, and these dynamics’ importance for a polarising world.
Looking at your research on the Soviet roots of Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, how has Russia managed to maintain its position as a mediator in the Putin era?
As I have argued, they often suggest that they can resolve conflicts, but rarely do so. Their engagement in conflict resolution diplomacy is instead used to justify their frequent involvement in both sides of conflicts in the Middle East, in order to assure their influence in the region. This approach has worked for Russia, as all states in the region cooperate with them to a certain extent. Russian support for opposing sides, though, means that Moscow is not always well-liked by those states. Russia also wants to avoid large-scale involvement in war; they want to keep the pot boiling, but not boiling over, which has been their approach to the region since the Soviet and even Tsarist era.
How important are the UN and other institutions of global diplomacy in Russia’s strategy in the Middle East?
I think it’s very important to Moscow, as a permanent member of the Security Council with the ability to veto resolutions. A lot of their diplomacy stems from their position in the Security Council.
In a recent article, you looked at the impacts of the second Trump administration, and the fall of Assad on Russia and Iran’s relationship. What impact do you think this complication of regional relations will have on the Middle East’s stability?
The fall of Assad was a blow to both Russia and Iran. Russia has been distracted by its involvement in the Ukraine war, and failed to protect Assad from being deposed. The only consolation for Russia and Iran was that the government which emerged was not openly pro-western. And following the fall of Assad, the Russians in their ever-shameless way asked if they could keep their military bases in Syria which they had been using to attack HTS forces just weeks before, and the new government is still considering this.
Many Arab states had respected Putin before this, as they saw Russia as being more supportive of its allies than the US which they saw as letting its weakened allies fall. However, this latest development in Syria demonstrates that Russia is willing to do the same and abandon its allies. Yes, Putin did offer Assad asylum in Russia, but other Arab leaders are hoping they will never need this kind of support. The abandonment of Assad definitely made Russia look more unreliable in the region.
Trump on the other hand, despite his many flaws, has been willing to drop sanctions on Syria which is quite amazing considering the Israeli protest against it. How the US relationship will function there is yet not clear, but Trump is playing realpolitik more successfully in this region than anticipated. Many countries in the West fear Iran getting nuclear weapons, but Russia doesn’t. The thing they fear more is a rapprochement between the US and Iran, and they will work hard to keep the US and Iran in opposition to each other.
How do you interpret the Trump administration’s new approach to Syria? Is it purely interest-based or is there a wider strategy to it?
It is very difficult to tell, but the main benefit of the new government in Syria is that it isn’t allied to Iran. I think there is also an element of pragmatism in the Trump administration’s approach, recognising that despite HTS’s roots in Al-Qaeda, this government is open to change. It’s a surprise, considering some conservative voices’ heavy condemnation of these groups, that the administration is willing to work with them. Trump has also been encouraged by friendly states in the region; Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Türkiye. These are all states Trump wants to work with and so they have been persuasive in influencing him to work with the new Syrian regime.
Related to this, and the wider change of approach in international relations globally, do you think that this is reflective of a new system of international relations, or a continuation of older approaches?
To begin with on the US, part of this is driven by Trump’s greater friendliness toward some authoritarian leaders than toward many democratic ones. He seems to prefer to deal with and surround himself with these authoritarian leaders. The Trump administration is also very hostile not only towards Democrats but also towards some Republicans like the neo-conservatives who supported an interventionist foreign policy.
Trump has a preference for great-power bargains or direct dealings with other world leaders, but the issue with this is that these agreements often don’t last, because authoritarian leaders often try to renegotiate these agreements. If Trump makes a deal with someone, it is also easy for him to renege on it or reject it.
Are some of Trump’s foreign policy approaches more reflective of countries in the Middle East than countries in the West, which are more value-based?
Well I think the idea of ‘western values’ is something neuralgic in the Middle East, where they are actually regarded as harmful. Many states think that democratisation will lead to absolute chaos, and that authoritarianism is required to keep order. The fact that Trump is willing to engage with them without any mention of values is something they like. The trouble is, as someone who lived through the 70s and 80s whilst the US supported many dictatorships, dictatorships have a tendency of falling. They are often unpopular and are replaced, and those which replace them have a habit of resenting the external supporters of the regimes they overthrew.
People forget that values themselves have a strategic element. We don’t pursue a values-based foreign policy just because it’s “the right thing to do,” , but also because not doing so can harm our interests. For example, if you look at US support for the unpopular regime of the Shah of Iran, after his overthrow the new Iranian regime resented the US for having supported him. Resentment about this has remained in Iran to this day. The interest-based approach may seem better because it doesn’t factor in public opinion or values, but at some point disregard for values can undermine interest-based agreements and create resentment.
Focussing now on the Ukraine War and your work on the importance of the Black Sea and the Middle East to the conflict. Has the importance of the Black Sea to Russia’s involvement in the Middle East informed reactions to the Ukraine War from Middle Eastern states?
To begin with, states in the Middle East just don’t see the Ukraine War as their business and don’t want to be involved. They also see the war as an economic opportunity, as the West placed sanctions on Russia which they have seen this as an opportunity to profit from by facilitating Russia’s trade through the region. Many states in the Middle East also see Russia as an inevitability, and don’t see the point in harming relations with a state that will not be upended any time soon. Many in the region resent how the West has focused more on Ukrainian suffering compared to Palestinian, Yemeni, and Sudanese suffering.
Another question is that if Russia is successful in Ukraine, what will it do next? Whatever it does could affect the region significantly. As long as the war is in stalemate, Middle Eastern countries are comfortable and can benefit to an extent, but if Russia does win, then it may turn its unwelcome attention toward Middle East. Then again, a Russia victorious in Ukraine may become preoccupied with confronting Europe, which may limit the ability of western states like the US to support their Middle Eastern allies.
To what extent do you see Russia and Middle Eastern states like the Gulf states aligning on seeking a more multipolar world order?
The question fundamentally is what would a multipolar world be like? For the Russians, a multipolar world is a world of great powers where the West is less powerful, and Russia is more powerful; they don’t have this democratic notion of more equality among all states, including those in the global south. In the Middle East, there are a few regional powers but there is no one dominant state, unlike some other regions. Instead, there are several contending powers, which all turn to external great powers to support them. Looking at countries like Türkiye, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran: they all have ambitions in the region and are willing to work with Russia to the extent that it serves their own interests, but they are not going to allow a state like Russia to impinge on them.
Personally, I never thought that the world was unipolar, or even bipolar in the Cold War era. I have always thought that the world is multipolar. But, now there seems to be a growing sentiment that the weakening of the West might improve balance in the global order. However, I think these people will be disappointed at the result if the West does weaken, and I think we will see conflict flaring up between non-western actors, as there will be no coherent vision of how to govern the world order.
There is a proliferation of new multilateral organisations in the global south, with organisations such as BRICS. Do you see these as important for Russia’s relationship with the Middle East?
I think that despite Moscow’s rhetoric on multilateral organisations, Russia prefers to conduct relations bilaterally. Russia also compartmentalises relations, cooperating with a variety of states that are opposed to each other, such as Iran and the UAE, which pushes countries into courting Russia even though it is supporting their adversary. I think that BRICS looks really good from the outside as an expanding multilateral organisation, however its not necessarily that beneficial for Russia. For the first time the other day I used some AI programmes, asking questions like “How does Egypt regard the impact of BRICS expansion on Russia”. The AI reports I got indicated that BRICS expansion was seen as good for Russia, but that the more BRICS expands, the weaker Russia’s influence in it becomes.
What I find fascinating is that when I talk to scholars and policymakers across the global south, I sense that there is a genuine enthusiasm for BRICS and BRICS expansion, and that there is this real desire for a non-western world order. But if the global south can somehow get rid of the West as the leader of global governance, will the countries of the global south get along with each other? Many of those global south states haven’t got along very well with one another so far, and BRICS doesn’t contain any mechanisms for conflict resolution. Because of this I think it’s mostly a talking forum. Nevertheless, there is a strong desire in the global south for systemic change away from the order designed and maintained by the West. There’s no guarantee, though, that a new global south-dominated system would be any better than the Western-dominated one. If you look at the history of power transitions, they are generally accompanied by a lot of conflict. I don’t see why a transition to a global south-dominated world order would be any different.
You wrote an article in 2023 entitled ‘Can America Still Pass the Mearsheimer Test?’, and considering the significant changes in US foreign policy this year, can the US still pass the Mearsheimer test?
This is definitely more of an open question now than when I wrote that article, and what’s interesting is that the US can only pass the test if it actually wants to pass it. Just to recap, the Mearsheimer test was posited by the famous scholar John Mearsheimer, who stated that the United States was the only ‘great power’ that was the predominant power in one region (the Western hemisphere), and able to prevent any other power from dominating any other region of the world. There are a few questions surrounding this idea, such as how to define regions; if regions are really big like ‘Asia’ or ‘Africa’ then it is difficult to be a predominant great power in them, but if they are smaller, there are more possibilities. For example, I doubt the US can prevent another great power from dominating Central Asia, but can prevent one from dominating Asia as a whole.
Under the Trump administration, there is a hostility towards engagement in some regions like Africa, with the closing of embassies, USAID programmes, and hostility to Black African leaders. Africa, though, is a centrally important region, with a large amount of economic growth underway there and the presence of strategic minerals, with lots of engagement from other powers like China and Russia. If the US withdraws from Africa, then the power of other states in Africa will increase, and whilst it’s unlikely that one country will become predominant, the US may lose almost all of its influence, which could have ramifications for Europe’s influence there too.
This instinct for restraint on the global stage which is being pushed by a lot of the conservatives in the Trump administration is informed by people disillusioned by America’s long negative experience in the war on terror and reject the US’s foreign policy approach of that period. JD Vance and Pete Hegseth are two such people. These people then projected their negative experiences with Afghanistan and Iraq onto the Ukraine War, concluding that the US shouldn’t get involved.
Do you agree with those that claim the US’s foreign policy has become focused on spheres of influence, and does that suggest that maybe the Trump administration would be unwilling to pass the Mearsheimer test?
Your chancellor Fiona Hill wrote in her memoir about her experience at the National Security Council, and called Trump “1980s man” because she sees that he, like Reagan, ultimately wants to avoid war. I think instead Trump might be “1880s man” because a lot of his policies are reminiscent of the period; the dominance of tariffs as a revenue source for the US government, no income tax, and a focus on domestic production. At this time the US was being regionally assertive but not globally engaged, becoming involved in conflicts in Latin America and the Pacific but no further. This is something Trump is emulating to a degree. So really, I think the US with the support of its allies currently still has the capability to pass the Mearsheimer test (by remaining predominant in the Western hemisphere and preventing any other great power from dominating any other major region of the world), but it’s now a question of whether the Trump administration wants to do so, and where its current policies are heading in terms of global engagement.
UK Forum on a Multipolar World 
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