Dr Nic Cheeseman – Democratic Resilience in an Age of Autocratisation

Dr Nic Cheeseman is professor of Democracy and International Development, and director of the Centre for Elections, Democracy, Accountability and Representation at the University of Birmingham. Dr Cheeseman’s research focuses on democratic resilience in an era of autocratisation, as well as political thought in sub-Saharan Africa, having previously served as the Director of the African Studies Centre at Oxford University. Dr Cheeseman has contributed extensively to research on democratic resilience through a number of publications and policy documents, such as a recent co-authored piece for the European Democracy Hub, ‘How to Strengthen Democratic Resilience: Five Lessons for Democratic Renewal’. His co-authored book The Rise of Authoritarian Middle-Powers and What It Means for World Politics is being published later this year. In this interview we covered the nature of democratic resilience, current threats to democratic regimes, and the unevenness of democracies in different world regions. 

What is democratic resilience?

Democratic resilience refers to a system’s capacity not merely to survive shocks—such as economic crises, pandemics, or external pressures—but to adapt its structures and processes so as to preserve core democratic principles (free and fair elections, civil liberties, and rule of law) even under stress. In other words, resilience implies both resistance to subversion and proactive institutional learning that makes democracy stronger over time.

Why is democratic resilience distinct from preventing authoritarianism?

Preventing authoritarianism often focuses on blocking immediate power grabs—coups, executive aggrandisement, or electoral fraud—whereas democratic resilience emphasises deeper, long-term adaptation. Resilience means strengthening democratic “ecosystems” so that even “established” democracies can evolve and improve, rather than simply resisting illiberal tendencies. Thus, resilience goes beyond “holding the line” against autocratic incursions to encompass continuous reform and inclusion (e.g., expanding minority rights, countering disinformation, reducing inequality).

Why have democratic states often failed to transform in ways that bolster resilience? Any effective examples?

Many democracies lack the political will or institutional flexibility to undertake the systemic reforms needed—whether because of entrenched partisan interests, weak civic coalitions, or limited policy innovation. For instance, although populist pressures and polarisation have highlighted democratic flaws, few countries have overhauled campaign-finance laws, judicial appointments, or digital governance strategies at scale. Germany and Norway have taken some steps to institutionalise and protect the independence of the judiciary by increasing the threshold to undermine the security of tenure of judges. But remarkably few countries have followed suit.

How should policymakers balance the international nature of democratic backsliding with each state’s unique context?

Policymakers must recognise that while backsliding often follows transnational patterns—such as the adoption of disinformation tactics or regional autocratic alliances—solutions must be tailored to domestic political cultures, histories, and power structures. A “one-size-fits-all” toolkit risks failure; instead, interventions (e.g., civic education, judicial support, digital-media regulation) must reflect local institutions’ strengths and vulnerabilities. Put another way, “context matters” because each pathway to erosion (e.g., executive aggrandisement versus polarised populism) requires different remedies.

How do democracies manage the necessity to engage with authoritarian states given their potential to undermine democratic legitimacy?

Democracies often face a dilemma: engaging authoritarian regimes on trade, security, or climate issues can lend them legitimacy. Democracies must therefore adopt the mantra “first, do no harm”. This means combining careful assistance designed not to further entrench authoritarian regimes in power, with simultaneous support for local civil society and independent media. Rather than blanket engagement, this approach prioritises channels (e.g., funding diaspora NGOs, digital-security training, and supporting investigative journalism) that strengthen domestic actors who defend democratic norms. It also means recognising that many projects and programmes will be subverted to support authoritarian governments, and that trying to “avoid” political issues by focussing on development rarely works, because how development works, and who it helps, are inherently political questions.

You identify that democracies need to prioritise cases of gradual democratic erosion. How can we better study and communicate these to the public?

Gradual erosion is harder to spot because it happens over a long period of time. This also means that it is often also harder to fight, because it is often not clear exactly which moment is the critical one to galvanise broad coalitions to fight for democracy. One way to study this process and communicate it to the public is to adopt a spotlight on hidden processes such as democracy capture, as a new initiative of the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) is trying to do as we speak. We can also track democratic erosion using regularly updated indicators (e.g., legislative independence scores, judicial-appointment metrics, media-freedom indexes). Combining these quantitative indices with narrative case studies (highlighting, say, incremental legal tweaks that weaken checks and balances) helps citizens grasp why small changes matter. Public discussion forums, interactive dashboards, and partnerships with independent fact-checkers can translate technical findings into accessible stories, thereby raising awareness before crises deepen. But of course to cut through we also need more than data and methods – we need charismatic leaders and effective influencers who can share these messages and make people see why these things matter so much to their own everyday lives. 

How important is the Internet and social media in the wave of democratic backsliding?

Digital platforms have accelerated both mobilisation and manipulation: while civil society can use social media to organise protests or fact-check false claims, autocratic actors exploit the same channels to spread disinformation, amplify polarising content, and target vulnerable demographics. At present, digital disinformation has become a particularly destabilising force that outpaces institutional responses (e.g., fact-checking lags behind viral falsehoods), thereby undermining trust in both elections and traditional media. We therefore need a much more concerted response both by activists, governments and regulators.

How does the pursuit of democratic resilience differ between states in the Global North and Global South?

These terms are increasingly contested and controversial, but let me try – In Global North democracies, resilience efforts often focus on mitigating high-tech disinformation, polarising populism, and institutional distrust among privileged electorates. By contrast, Global South states may still be consolidating basic civil-liberty protections, building parliamentary capacity, or ensuring judicial independence amidst weaker rule-of-law traditions. But it is also important to be clear that we should not exaggerate these differences. In many countries in the Global North, such as Hungary and the United States, we see cases of executive aggrandisement that threaten to undermine basic democratic and legal standards – and high-tech disinformation is also a major challenge in many Global South countries, so what we really need to do is break down these barriers and encourage democratic activists and leaders to share strategies and success stories across borders. 

How does democratic resilience relate to development in the Global South? What are some successes and failures?

High-quality democracies—characterised by accountable institutions and broad civic participation—tend to achieve better development outcomes, such as poverty reduction and service delivery. Successful cases include Brazil’s Bolsa Família programme, which combined participatory budgeting with conditional cash transfers to reduce inequality and build trust in local governments. Conversely, instances like Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation and electoral manipulation illustrate how weakened institutions (e.g., a politicised judiciary, repressed civil society) can derail both democratic checks and economic development. In sum, when resilience is low—due to brittle institutions or civic repression—development gains often become unsustainable; where resilience is higher, democratic governance reinforces, rather than undermines, growth.