By Deiniol Brown
Dr Ralf Emmers is a professor in the international politics of East Asia at SOAS University of London. He is currently the Co-Chair of the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at SOAS, having previously served as the Dean of the Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Dr Emmers is currently on the editorial board for the journal The Pacific Review, having contributed to a variety of journals on East Asian international relations. Dr Emmers’ research focuses on forms of security in the Asia Pacific, especially in Southeast Asia, and global power dynamics in the region. Dr Emmers has published extensively on these topics, and earlier this year he contributed to Chatham House’s research paper ‘Competing Visions of International Order’, looking at how Indonesia aims to balance competing interests in Southeast Asia. In our conversation, we discussed the role of middle powers in the new uncertain state of international relations, as well as the position of Southeast Asia regarding US-China rivalry, and the continuing relevance of non-traditional security.
How important are middle powers in the Asia Pacific, such as Indonesia, for deciding the outcome of US-China disputes, such as the Trump administration’s recent trade war?
By definition, middle powers have limited capabilities meaning that they need to make choices in the areas where they are able to make an impact. Middle powers also very often need to work multilaterally, working with other middle powers to try to achieve their objectives. Nevertheless, in an in an era of rising great power competition, as well as a potential withdrawal of the United States from some parts of the world, it is clear that the middle powers although they might be secondary players have a role to play in facilitating global governance. The role middle powers often play in global and regional governance is essential for addressing functional areas of cooperation, and building bridges between competing parties. It also depends to an extent on whether Washington and Beijing would be willing to allow such countries to get involved in these disputes. But I think we will see that in these areas, middle powers like Indonesia will attempt to build up coalitions to try to achieve certain objectives, which I would argue will generally be centred around sustaining governance questions as well as bridging disagreements between great powers.
You’ve written a lot about ASEAN from a security perspective, which is often viewed as an economic partnership. What would you say is the relevance of ASEAN for security in the Asia Pacific?
A first point that I would make is that ASEAN is not actually an alliance; it doesn’t have a clear military component, it was not established with an obvious external enemy in mind and it doesn’t have deterrence capabilities. What ASEAN does do is look at security from a different point of departure. It examines security as something which is linked to socio-economic development and political stability within the individual member countries, so it’s inclusive in its approach, and it wants to build dialogues with all kinds of potential external powers and get them involved in regional security. This is an understanding of security which takes us away from alliance theory and alliance building, focusing very much on confidence, on trust building, on dialogue.
ASEAN, using this particular model of security, is currently going through a challenging time because we are very clearly moving back towards a world defined more by competing blocs. Realists would tell us that we’ve always lived in that, but I think if we were to compare where we are today to ten, fifteen, twenty years ago, we can see a remarkable change in the international system. So, what ASEAN can continue to do in the current climate is to try to provide this alternative form of security building which is very much network-based, structured around things like summits. Through these, ASEAN is trying to promote understandings around things like particular rules of engagement with great powers.
But at the moment ASEAN is facing this difficult challenge of not wanting to choose between the United States and China, trying to preserve its agency and autonomy in the region. I think it’s critical for East Asian security, but also security worldwide, that we have those alternative institutions or middle powers which promote that more nuanced understanding of security especially in this moment of great power competition.
Can you give an outline of the ‘Competing Networks’ idea of US-China competition in the Asia Pacific and why this is an important perspective?
This is a concept we used in a paper that I’ve recently co-published with my colleague and friend Sarah Teo, who teaches at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Essentially what we argue is that middle powers traditionally have relied on networks to promote certain types of foreign policy behaviour. This uses multilateralism, niche diplomacy, soft power and networks to provide opportunities for middle powers to enhance their influence by forming coalitions with other countries.
What Sarah and I are observing in East Asia is that both the United States and China are developing competing networks of cooperation that cut across security, economics and infrastructure projects especially in the context of China. You then have middle powers like Vietnam and Indonesia who do not want to be forced to choose between those two powers, so they engage and build relationships within those individual networks of the United States and China. But, only up to a point, because they don’t want to establish a relationship of exclusivity, so they navigate very carefully, preserving this kind of equidistance between the various parties.
I would argue that this understanding helps us explain what’s going on in East Asia, but it could also be applied to other regional bodies. If you take the BRICS for instance, which is a minilateral arrangement that has recently seen a very rapid expansion of its membership, you could argue that countries want to be part of a network like BRICS to preserve a non-aligned position which guarantees their level of agency and autonomy in the international system. So I would argue that this omnidirectional foreign policy is something which you’re going to see adopted by more and more players in the international system.
How does ASEAN and its network approach interact with the South China Sea dispute, as one of the largest hard-power issues facing Southeast Asia?
I fully agree with you that the South China Sea is probably the most significant traditional security question in Southeast Asia, involving China on the one hand and a series of Southeast Asian countries, namely Vietnam the Philippines Brunei and Malaysia on the other. I think this can be explored at two levels. First you have the state level, so the countries like Vietnam and the Philippines for instance who want to guarantee their rights and their territorial claims in the South China Sea, and are trying very much to preserve good relations with China while making no concessions. Here you are navigating very difficult waters of wanting to keep the United States engaged in the region but at the same time not wanting, once again, to choose sides between China and the US.
The second level of analysis would be what’s happening at the level of the organisation within ASEAN, which is neutral in the context of this dispute, and which is aiming to negotiate a code of conduct with China on how to behave in the South China Sea disputed waters. It is incredibly tricky for Southeast Asian diplomats because China is their number one trading partner and is their main source of infrastructure financing, so they don’t want to jeopardise that relationship, but on the other hand they want to preserve your sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Countries like Vietnam therefore look to ASEAN to multiply their influence on this issue because ASEAN is meant to speak with one voice, but that is not easily achievable because you have ten different countries many of whom are not even claimants in the South China Sea. The other states see no reason to antagonise China over that dispute, and just want to conduct business. Because of this it is probably one of the most significant diplomatic challenges that ASEAN and its members face. Some people argue that ASEAN therefore is not very effective, but I would argue that the Southeast Asian countries would be even worse off if they didn’t have this regional body to rely on.
How has the new US foreign policy shift, seen in policies like tariffs, affected ASEAN states’ networks?
Here we are looking at the first 100 days of the second Trump administration, where I think there have been two phases so far. Up until early April, the Southeast Asian countries probably felt that most of the attention of the administration was going elsewhere, on issues like the war in Ukraine, the Middle East, Greenland. The fact that Southeast Asia was not really on the radar of the second Trump administration was probably viewed with a sense of relief, with the region thinking they will be able to a more transactional deal with this second Trump administration similar to the first one.
Of course, with the proclamation of the reciprocal tariffs on the 5th of April, the situation certainly changed. I believe, looking at this at that board which President Trump was showcasing to the international media, you suddenly realise that multiple Southeast Asian countries and even some of the region’s poorest like Laos and Cambodia were going to suffer severe tariffs. At that point there was a sense of surprise in Southeast Asia, and a sense of disappointment that the region was going to be somehow involved in this trade war between the United States and China. As we know, all of the tariffs have now been suspended for a period of 90 days, allowing individual Southeast Asian countries to go directly to Washington to renegotiate those tariffs.
It’s too soon to be able to say where we will land exactly in this area, but I think some lessons can already be learned. It looks like Southeast Asia will ultimately be part of those great international transformations, especially regarding international trade which is very significant for the future development of the Southeast Asian countries. It also looks like, rather than trying to take a multilateral approach to respond to this by trying to negotiate through ASEAN which was probably unrealistic, Southeast Asian countries have decided to negotiate bilaterally with the United States.
ASEAN often gets compared to the EU as two differing approaches to multilateral regional organisations. Do you see ASEAN as primarily pragmatic and interest-based, or do you see it as being idealistic or value-driven?
I actually always encourage my students not to compare ASEAN to the European Union but to compare it instead to other regional bodies in the Global South, because because the European Union which has a much stronger supernational dimension, pooling together it’s members sovereignty. In certain spheres of policymaking, ASEAN is a quintessential intergovernmental organisation, where countries decided to join not to pool sovereignty but to strengthen their own sovereignty by addressing social and economic difficulties. So, the starting point of the two organisations is very different, and I do agree with you that ASEAN probably has this more pragmatic approach. ASEAN is not driven by a normative agenda, there is not a particular political system that you must adopt in order to join the association and you do not have that legalistic approach to interstate cooperation.
That being said, ASEAN does stand for some norms and principles; the norms and the principles found in the UN charter. Territorial integrity, sovereignty, and non-use of force. These norms and principles are captured in what the Southeast Asian countries refer to as the “ASEAN Way”, the reliance on things like quiet diplomacy, good neighbourly behaviour and so on. There is therefore a normative agenda in the ASEAN context which leads to a code of conduct of how you are expected to behave in international affairs.
Looking at middle powers more generally, has the recent multipolarisation of global politics diminished the role of middle powers, or has it empowered them?
This question is yet to be defined: are we moving towards a world of more great power competition, or are we moving towards a multipolar world where coalitions of middle powers are playing a pivotal role in their regions and globally in addressing common challenges. In a multipolar world, you could argue that middle powers definitionally will play a pivotal role, as they coalesce around common interests such as sustaining international law and trading systems. Alternatively, in a world of great power competition, you would see a diminished role for middle powers as they would be given no agency or role to play in the international system.
Do middle powers have some unique advantages in the international system compared to larger powers?
One advantage they often have is that they are perceived as being legitimate and benign by other powers. This element of goodwill allows them to enhance their influence in international forums. However, if you do see a weakening of these international platforms where middle powers are able to contribute, then their role will be diminished significantly. For instance, if the UN continues to decline in efficacy and legitimacy, this undermines the role that middle powers can play through UN agencies and forums to try and influence international relations. Middle powers, multilateralism and global governance often come together, and the weakening of one will have negative repercussions on the other.
Based on your recent article written with John Bradford, to what extent do India and China’s interests converge in challenging the Asia Pacific’s status quo?
I am not an expert on India, but looking at China and India’s position in the region, I see more divergence than convergence. I think both are keen to see the emergence of a multipolar world, but I see Beijing and New Delhi as in direct competition. China sometimes assumes it will play a dominant hegemonic role in the region, but it is obvious that India does not want to allow China that role. The two countries have had border disputes and some direct competition in recent years, so I expect to see China and India involved in a power distribution struggle in the coming years, rather than coalescing around common objectives on the international scene.
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