Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa – The EU in the Age of Trump: Balancing US-China Relations

By Deiniol Brown

Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa is a geopolitics strategist with a focus on Asia-Europe relations. He consults for public and private sector entities. Over two decades, he successfully managed the complexities of European law, politics, and institutions, complemented by elected positions in political office. Sebastian has written extensively global politics for publications such as the South China Morning Post, China-US- Focus, Asia Times, Taihe Institute and the Diplomat. Possessing two Master’s degrees and completing leadership programs at IESE (Spain) and HKU (Hong Kong), Sebastian is fluent in Spanish, English, French, and Italian. This interview explores recent geopolitical events and the EU’s role, discussing Europe’s evolving relationship with the US during the second Trump presidency, and the implications this may have for Europe’s stance towards China in the coming years. 

In an article from 2021, you argue that the EU is seeking ‘strategic sovereignty’ in its evolving relations with China. Will the EU, rather than European NATO members, be forced to take on a more geopolitical role in the current circumstances? How do you see the EU’s role developing?

My point was that the EU’s geopolitical ascent was often regarded as an inevitable progression, but one that proved too complex to realize. Driven more by necessity than unity, it meant to complement NATO rather than replace it. 4 years later, this assessment remains valid, but progress has been minimal.

Consider that most EU states are NATO members, with only a few exceptions (Ireland, Austria, Cyprus, and Malta). NATO includes key non-EU states like the U.K., Canada, Türkiye, and Norway, underscoring distinct roles in European security.

Regarding the EU, it has indeed faced growing pressure to step up geopolitically, especially since Obama’s 2011 Pivot to Asia, which signalled a shift in U.S. strategic focus. Yet it has struggled to do so. Von der Leyen’s 2019 declaration of a “geopolitical Commission” remains largely unfulfilled.

In this context, the push for strategic autonomy or sovereignty emerged in 2018 as a response to excessive dependence on the U.S., particularly in defence, rather than as a direct reaction to China as it has been interpreted lately.

With Trump’s return threatening U.S. commitments to NATO and Ukraine, the EU faces even greater pressure to take on a geopolitical role. European NATO members remain central to hard security, while the EU’s recent policy toolkit—trade, regulation, climate—leaves it ill- equipped to lead on global affairs.

The EU must develop as a self-reliant actor, shaping policies independent of Washington, particularly in trade negotiations with Beijing. It could position itself as a mediator between the U.S. and China, asserting greater autonomy. However, its ability to do so remains constrained by internal divisions and the absence of strong leadership.

How will this change in the EU’s policy orientation affect the nature and future of the EU itself?

This shift should have pushed the EU toward political maturity, evolving beyond an economic bloc. A more assertive approach would necessitate deeper integration in foreign policy and defence—joint procurement or a EU military capability—but risks exposing internal divisions.

The EU’s future depends on its ability to consolidate its 27 voices into a coherent force. Greater integration—such as unified defence spending or a common foreign policy—would be essential to counterbalance Washington’s retreat. Yet, despite frequent discussions over the past 5 years, concrete progress has been minimal.

In an article published in January, you called for Europe to be a ‘balancing force’ in regards to China. How should Europe’s policies towards China change in order to better achieve that?

Europe’s approach to China must shift from reactive measures to a clear, independent strategy that balances economic interests with geopolitical stability. The EU’s failure to develop a coherent stance has left it vulnerable—caught between Washington’s pressure to contain Beijing and its own economic reliance on Chinese markets.

Rather than oscillating between alignment with the U.S. and—thus far failed—attempts at ‘de-risking’, Europe could establish a unified US-China policy that enables it to handle this rivalry on its own terms. This means prioritizing strategic economic resilience—such as strengthening supply chains and fostering homegrown green tech—while avoiding short- sighted protectionism, as seen in the mishandled EV tariffs.

Additionally, Europe must resist narratives that frame China as a security threat without clear justification, as this risks escalating tensions and compromising diplomatic flexibility. Is China a military threat to Europe, really? Instead, the EU should leverage its position as a global economic power rather than merely responding to U.S. or Chinese actions.

Without a coordinated approach, Europe faces marginalization, either as a subordinate to Washington or as an incoherent bloc unable to negotiate effectively with Beijing. The choice is between strategic autonomy or increasing irrelevance.

Your idea of the ‘cataclysmic butterfly effect’ is powerful in encapsulating Trump’s knock on effects for Europe’s international relations. However, there is still a lot of criticism towards China, as you have noted. Is there a possibility that Europe is able to maintain its largely critical position towards China and what would that mean for its economy?

Trump’s retreat from Europe, coupled with his “realpolitik on steroids”, has left the continent vulnerable to external influence. Beijing sees this as an opportunity to reshape its relationship with Europe, especially after the failure of the CAI (Comprehensive Agreement on Investment). The EU’s fragmented response to shifting U.S. priorities—oscillating between loyalty and strategic autonomy—exposes its incapacity to counter China.

Despite criticism of China within the European Commission, the bloc’s economic realities complicate any rigid stance. European leaders recognize that economic engagement with Beijing remains crucial. The EU’s reliance on China for critical minerals, tech supply chains, and trade stability limits its ability to maintain adversarial postures. Even with calls to reduce dependency, European economies cannot afford a full decoupling for the years to come.

If Europe sustains a critical position, it risks further economic strain, particularly as the U.S. pressures allies to align with its protectionist measures. Trump’s approach favouring direct deals over multilateralism, exacerbates this dilemma. Washington’s tariffs and interference in European affairs make it difficult for Brussels to balance transatlantic ties while containing China. Meanwhile, Beijing will exploit these fractures, offering incentives to European industries and positioning itself as a pragmatic alternative to an unpredictable U.S.

Ultimately, Europe’s strategic paralysis makes a consistent China policy unlikely. While rhetorical criticism may persist, economic necessity will drive pragmatic engagement by the member states, ensuring that China retains leverage over Europe’s future.

Conversely, if, as some have suggested, a China-Europe rapprochement is currently underway, what are some compromises that Europe will have to make?

If Europe moves toward rapprochement with China, it will have to compromise on several key issues. First, Brussels would need to soften its hopeless moralising on human rights and far- away geopolitical concerns, including potential tensions over Taiwan. While some European leaders have been vocal on these issues, a closer economic relationship with Beijing would require a more restrained diplomatic approach, pure realpolitik.

Second, Europe would likely have to loosen restrictions on Chinese investment, particularly in strategic sectors. The failure of the CAI demonstrated how U.S. influence blocked deeper economic ties, but a renewed push for engagement would mean revisiting European policies on Chinese acquisitions, particularly in tech and infrastructure. This could trigger internal resistance, especially from security-focused states.

Third, Brussels may need to recalibrate its trade policies to accommodate Chinese interests, including toning down its economic security agenda. Measures like anti-subsidy probes into Chinese EVs or restrictions on 5G deployment might be softened to encourage reciprocal access to the Chinese market. This would challenge the EU’s efforts to reduce economic dependence on Beijing while avoiding retaliatory measures that harm key European industries.

Finally, rapprochement would require Europe to assert greater autonomy from Washington. Trump’s protectionist stance and open hostility toward the EU make this more plausible, but it would still be a delicate balancing act. Aligning too closely with China risks alienating the U.S., especially in security matters.

In short, a rapprochement would demand political flexibility, economic concessions, and a recalibration of Europe’s strategic posture. While the EU may frame this shift as constructive, it would signal a deeper adjustment in how Brussels positions itself between the world’s two largest powers.

In recent days, there seems to be a sense of European unity and commonality on defence and international relations, at least in relation to Ukraine the deterioration of US-Ukraine relations. Do you see the possibility of a coherent strategy being formed out of this movement? What could it look like?

No, I do not. Europe’s handling of the Russo-Ukrainian war reveals a gap between rhetoric and action—grand declarations of an “existential” threat since 2022 met with little beyond symbolic gestures until 2025. Beyond humanitarian aid, ineffective sanctions on Russia, and financial and military support, Europe has refrained from deploying troops, yet proclamations of “unwavering support” persist, reducing policy to political theatre. So, is it “existential” or not?

Three failures underscore this void. First, Europe has produced no credible peace initiative, while even Trump advocates resolution. Second, public patience wears thin as soaring energy costs bankroll a war with no clear outcome. Third, the EU’s insistence on a Ukrainian victory, without defining what that means or how to achieve it, exposes its strategic incoherence.

Trump’s return strips away the illusion: Europe merely followed Biden’s lead while feigning independent policy. The promise of EU membership for Ukraine is painful—accession before the 2030s is impossible, yet European leaders perpetuate the illusion. In a nutshell, EU’s policy on the Ukraine war has failed, and now it struggles to mask the reality.

If the populist right of European politics emerges as a more dominant force over the next 

few years, how would this affect Europe as a bloc and its relations with China and the US?

A more dominant populist right in Europe would not translate into a unified foreign policy, particularly regarding China. While these parties share a scepticism toward Brussels and a preference for national sovereignty, their positions on Beijing diverge significantly. Some, like Le Pen’s National Rally in France and Salvini’s League in Italy, have advocated a more pragmatic approach to China, emphasizing trade ties and opposing ideological confrontation. Hungary’s Orbán openly courts Chinese investment, making Budapest a key European gateway for Beijing. In contrast, parties like Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) and Spain’s Vox align more closely with Washington, viewing China as a strategic threat. Germany’s AfD oscillates, initially critical of Chinese economic influence yet shifted toward a more China-friendly stance since around 2023.

This fragmentation could mean a stronger populist right would create a more unpredictable EU foreign policy, weakening transatlantic coordination while giving Beijing new avenues to deepen bilateral ties with select European states.

How is Hong Kong, as a city attached to global markets, reacting to the US’s international reorientation under Trump? How is Hong Kong potentially positioning itself in this context?

Hong Kong’s business elite, among the savviest in the world, excel at tackling geopolitical shifts to safeguard commercial interests. With Trump’s return, they are likely to continue their balancing act—one foot in Beijing, the other in Washington.

Despite Beijing’s tighter grip, Hong Kong remains indispensable as a conduit for Chinese capital accessing global markets. Its financiers understand that defiance of China is impossible, yet full subservience would erode the city’s unique value. Many hedge their bets, maintaining U.S. ties through investments, compliance with Western regulations, and strategic partnerships.

If Trump escalates economic confrontation with China, Hong Kong’s elite will likely push for a dual-track strategy: deepening yuan-based trade and financial mechanisms while preserving dollar liquidity and Western market access—ensuring the city retains its role as an irreplaceable bridge East-West.