Dr Elisa Gambino is a Hallsworth Research Fellow in Political Economy at Manchester University’s Global Development Institute and an adjunct researcher at the Centre for Asian Studies at the University of Ghana. Dr Gambino’s research focusses on Chinese infrastructure projects in sub-Saharan Africa, Chinese investment in the trade and manufacturing sectors, and the socio-political implications of this. Dr Gambino conducts her research through extensive field studies, grounding her observations in the local social contexts of her research participants, which provides unique and complex insights on the local realities of globally relevant issues.
In your most recent publication you discuss the impacts of the Abidjan-Lagos corridor project on the political economy of the region. Do you think this example reflects a wider trend in development infrastructure?
I would say this does reflect a wider trend we see in sub-Saharan Africa. This specific project was an African initiative designed and partly funded by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but on the basis of strong incentives from organisations like the World Bank to increase connectivity to boost economic activity, alongside the introduction of tariff reductions. However, when researching it, it becomes clear that this corridor is not used extensively, but instead mostly for short journeys at the borders of the connected states. One of the largest incomes for coastal West African states is also import duties for goods trades with inland states. The corridor has therefore encouraged more competition between states for goods to transit through their country rather than others. When this project moved from the conceptualisation to the implementation phase, its function changed in practice, and ended up causing controversies.
What do you think are the current flaws in development finance institutions globally in their assessment and designing of projects such as this?
These issues are seen in a large variety of contexts, and these megaprojects often have many problems, costing more than projected and bringing less benefits than expected, which is called the megaproject paradox. Albert Hirschman’s book ‘Development Projects Observed’ looks at this question, proposing the principle of the ‘hidden hand’ where planners are shielded from the risks of projects and technical staff have too much optimism in their cost/benefit analysis because of their often technocratic perspective that neglects social dynamics. This has also been discussed more recently in terms of ‘the paradox of megaprojects’ by Bent Flybjerg and colleagues. There can be too much emphasis on technical and statistical data, and these projects can also be very political and therefore can be majorly affected by political cycles.
There is some debate about Africa developing as a stronger regional bloc for increased international power and control over economic policy. How feasible is this, Is there a case for African regionalism?
It has to be noted that African governments are already the largest financiers of infrastructure in Africa at the moment. But mobilising Africa as a bloc has been a longstanding challenge. Africa has a diverse mix of economies and many states and regions are competing against each other, including for investment. I have always been quite sceptical of how regional integration programmes are presented, especially in terms of their supposed ease of implementation and in light of their negative externalities, such as increased inter-state competition. However, during my fieldwork in West Africa this summer I have warmed to their potential, especially on a trade and industrialisation front as it would give great opportunities for African economies to grow and upgrade their industrial bases. I would say I’m now convinced, especially when it comes to the potentialities associated with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). This continental free trade agreement will be difficult to implement but is getting closer to becoming possible. At a regional level, the ECOWAS and SADC are good examples of African regional cooperation, putting improved connectivity and industrialisation front and centre.
The adoption of developmentalist economic policies in some African states such as Ethiopia have caused concerned from some western institutions. However, is this economic model necessarily incompatible with international economic interests?
Economic and political factors are interrelated for certain. Developmental states are often seen as intrinsically authoritarian, a notion notoriously rejected by Thandika Mkandawire. We should avoid making a normative judgement about how states ‘should’ pursue economic development. Research-wise, we should instead focus on how the state deploys itself towards development. There is often a political and moral agenda alongside the arguments against the developmental state. Yet, the notions and programmes promoted by free trade-oriented and neoliberal international organisations themselves can have negative impacts on African countries. As a brief example, developing countries have paid four trillion dollars in interest payments alone to creditors in the global North between early 1980s-mid2010s as highlighted by Jerome Roos, but Structural Adjustment Programmes in African nations have often undermined development goals.
Much of your work looks at Chinese investment in infrastructure in Africa. What is the extent of China’s influence over states through infrastructure projects? And what are the strategies and outcomes regarding the popular and elite influence of these projects?
China has only limited agenda-setting power over specific projects, however Chinese companies can sometimes scout projects and propose projects to African governments directly. Chinese companies sometimes also combine multiple components of large infrastructure projects together in a single ‘package’, for instance requesting funding from Chinese banks directly. There is still a big debate about the effect of infrastructure on African states politically; they have to recognise the legitimacy of the PRC over Taiwan, and usually have to hire Chinese companies and use a certain percentage of Chinese materials. Large projects might also reduce policy space, as increasing debt levels can limit the availability of state resources to be directed to other sectors or initiatives. Despite the recent move towards more responsible finance and debt restructuring, debt distress remains a concern for many countries that have borrowed heavily from Chinese and non-Chinese sources alike. Elite interests are particularly important in African contexts, and can often be disconnected from the wider public. Projects can be used to get prestige for elections, legitimise a regime or to distribute awards to political allies in the state. Locally, there can be backlash especially due to environmental impacts and labour relations. In Kenya for example there have been protests about planned energy infrastructure, guided by the DeCOALonise movement, and lots of controversies around labour relations in construction sites. Alongside infrastructure or energy projects there is often a lot of corporate social responsibility (CSR) work to engage with local populations, such as building schools, sanitation, cultural institutions, however in the case of Chinese actors, this is not really widely publicised.
There is some debate in scholarship about the importance of institutions compared to traditional power relationships in informing the agency of African states. How important are institutions in deciding African agency in relations to China?
In Africa there are a lot of different forms of state agency in relation to China. In Ethiopia, there is a strong focus on capacity- and expertise- building, with commissions evaluating Chinese-funded project proposals across sectors. This is not the case in Kenya, for instance, where projects in different sectors are evaluated by different ministries, thus often resulting in limited information-sharing. Benin is also a great example when it comes to African agency. Folashadé Soulé has written excellently about the agency of Benin, arguing that the bureaucratic structure and the bureaucrats themselves are often shaping relationships. Other states have been less successful. Lastly, subnational actors also have an important role to play as we can see in cases like Kenya, and can have a big influence on projects and how they are implemented, albeit not as much in their agenda-setting phases, which usually involve centralised decision-making processes.
In your article ‘Infrastructure and the politics of African state agency’, you say that ”African agency is shaped but not predetermined by power asymmetry”. The IR community often has difficulty understanding this, especially when looking at Chinese involvement in Africa. Why do you think that is, and how can we better communicate this nuanced situation?
There are plenty of people in IR engaging in structure and agency in a nuanced way, but there is a massive dominance of realism when looking at China. The logic of realist grand strategy is often applied. There is also a long history of viewing African states as lacking agency and independence, and being easily influence, which echo Orientalist views. China studies scholars constantly argue that China’s relations are not purely state-centric and monolithic, but are fragmented but this is also overlooked in the dominant discourse. We need to better incorporate China studies into IR by conceptualising the Chinese state as complex, not a monolithic actor. In recent years, because of the geopolitical tension between the US and China, many have ‘jumped on the bandwagon’ of reductionist narratives. However, if you see everything through the lens of geopolitics you might lose sight of reality on the ground. For example, when conducting fieldwork in Ghana this summer, from the dozens of officials and institutions I have met, US-China rivalry was only mentioned once.
How do you approach quantifying and analysing the role of smaller Chinese companies on Global South interaction? Could you only do this by a case by case basis alone?
I am now focussing my research on the question of Chinese small and medium enterprises in Africa, looking at investment in Ghana and Togo to explore their impacts on regional integration and industrialisation. I approach this research project through a focus on networks fostering the internationalisation of Chinese capital rather than quantitative data, as this does not often capture engagement with the informal economy, small entrepreneurial ventures or companies fronted by West Africans for tax avoidance purposes. I also use geolocation methods to map Chinese businesses’ physical presence in an effort to generate different types of data to triangulate my findings. For example, I mapped all the Chinese shops (that I could find) in Ghana’s capital by personally walking around. I mainly use an ethnographic approach and conduct semi-structured interviews, and use very little quantitative data. In doing so, I try to purposely look at Chinese private capital in a loose way that reflects the messiness of what’s happening on the ground. While ethnographic research is often seen as not good enough at producing broad policy suggestions, I stand by its potential in providing insights crucial to evidence-based recommendations.
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